Coercion Under COMMUNITY law, as under US law, the coercion of buying two products together is a key element in establishing abusive lacing. Coercion can take many forms. Coercion is clearly present when the dominant company makes the sale of one thing an absolute condition for another. This condition may be express in an agreement (see e.B. Tetra Pak II) or de facto (see e.B. HUH). But even smaller forms of coercion, such as tariff incentives or withdrawal of services, may suffice if they are so powerful that customers would not choose to buy products individually. One example is Hilti`s refusal to comply with warranties when customers have used third-party nails in their Hilti weapons. As we have seen above, the separate product test serves as an indicator of the impact of binding agreements on the harm caused to competitors and on the well-being of consumers. If the separate product test is not met (e.g. There is no separate demand for the “related” product, which leads to the conclusion that (1) there is no injury to competition as there is no separate market for related products that could be excluded, and (2) the link improves welfare (otherwise consumers would demand products separately).

Conversely, if the separate product test is met, this leads to the conclusion that there could be harm to competition51 and that an identifier is unlikely to promote welfare. 144.C that knotting is privately profitable but potentially socially disadvantageous. In Hilti, the Commission went even further. It considered that it was in itself an abusive exploitation to deprive the consumer of the choice to purchase the linked products from separate suppliers: “This policy leaves the consumer no choice as to the source of his nails and, as such, abuses him.” 107 In other words, since each link restricts by definition the consumer`s choice in the manner described above, the Commission`s position in the Hilti decision strongly suggests that there is no need to establish foreclosure and that, therefore, the link is subject to a prohibition in itself (with the possible exception of objective justification). Third, a seller must have sufficient market power for a tied product to restrict competition in a tied product. Market power is measured by the number of buyers that the seller has induced to enter into a particular agreement. Sellers expand their market power by instiling other buyers to buy a related product. However, sellers are prohibited from dominating a particular market by tying an unreasonably large proportion of potential buyers to binding agreements. Second, the proportion of consumers who purchase a package instead of individual products gives an indication of the relative strengths of the package`s effectiveness relative to the benefits of choice. Where all (or almost) consumers prefer to buy bundles, there is a strong conjecture that the effectiveness of retention dominates the benefits of consumer choice. .